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> Upshot • The target article discusses 
the influence of the enactivist account 
of perception in computer science, be-
yond subjectivism and objectivism. I 
suggest going one step further and in-
troduce our VirtualEnaction platform, 
proposing a federative systemic view for 
brain-body-environment interaction for 
this analysis.
Introduction
« 1 » Thanks to recent advances in phi-
losophy and computer science, the authors 
of the target article propose a new analysis 
of the problems of misrepresentation and 
comparability of visual experience that were 
judged essential by Francisco Varela (Vare-
la, Thompson & Rosch 1991). In this com-
mentary, I would like to go one step further 
and evoke other advances that allow us not 
only to revisit these problems but also to as-
sociate them more closely.
« 2 » In §1 and §25 of their target ar-
ticle, Adrián Palacios, María-José Escobar 
and Esteban Céspedes clearly explain that, 
in an enactivist framework, perception is 
due to the co-determination between in-
ner mechanisms of the neurophysiological 
structure (subjectivism of neuronal feed-
back or lateral interactions, §23) and eco-
logical interaction in the environment (ob-
jectivism of a spectral reflectance for color 
perception, §22). We have recently built a 
global software simulator called VirtualEn-
action (denoyelle et al. 2014; 2015) that 
implements not only models of cerebral 
regions but also models of the body of an 
agent and of the environment in which it 
acts. With this platform, which also takes 
care of the simulation of interactions be-
tween these models, we are consequently 
able to observe in a unique and unified 
framework how perception is a property of 
the world enacted by the animal-environ-
ment co-determination, as proposed in §25 
for color perception.
« 3 » Even if problems of misrepresen-
tation and comparability emerge from con-
cepts of representation, it is explained in §5 
that a weak contextualist notion of represen-
tation is needed to analyze these problems 
and is still compatible with enactivism. A 
major interest of the target article is to argue, 
based on philosophical analysis, that a “non-
representationalist notion of representation” 
(§35) is necessary in our informational 
world and does not compromise the central 
view of enactivism, rejecting the representa-
tion of both purely objective and subjective 
properties. Instead, it can be supposed that, 
in the process of co-determination, some 
kind of representation (in the weak sense) is 
constituted, in idealized dimensional spaces. 
The representation of color perception in 
the weak sense, described in §31 as the state 
of the agent, of the environment, of senso-
rimotor activity and evolutionary history, is 
the kind of distributed representation that is 
built in VirtualEnaction. This computation-
al platform is consequently the ideal tool to 
revisit most concepts of the target article 
and raise new questions.
VirtualEnaction
« 4 » Researchers designing systemic 
models of the brain with the aim of imple-
menting large-scale executive functions 
have to consider the brain as a system in 
interaction with the body and the environ-
ment, and design robotic setups to emulate 
the emerging behavior. My team, together 
with neuroscientists, studies certain high-
level behaviors, i.e., survival strategies in a 
world with punishing and rewarding stimuli 
and agents, related to respondent and oper-
ant conditioning. The tasks are organized in 
long-lasting protocols, so that we can study 
the evolution of learning, elaborate some 
statistics, and make comparisons with bio-
logical observations. It proved difficult for 
us to use physical robots for long periods, 
and we also found it necessary to measure, 
quantify and control details of the brain 
model as well as of the environment, includ-
ing the body. This was our initial motivation 
for designing the VirtualEnaction platform.
« 5 » VirtualEnaction is an adapta-
tion of the Minecraft open game platform, 
where the usual human player is replaced by 
a software application corresponding to the 
model of the brain. The platform allows one 
to define the structure of the world and its 
intrinsic rules (e.g., moving agents, gravity, 
surface reflectance), the characteristics of 
the body (e.g., sensors for vision as well as 
for pain, actuators), and, of course, a module 
corresponding to the cerebral architecture 
defined for the considered task. Since every 
component is defined as a programmable 
software application, it is consequently pos-
sible to define precisely (and complexify at 
will) the kind of survival task, the character-
istics of the body, and the level of details in 
the neuronal module.
« 6 » This software platform has been 
designed and already used to analyze, with 
neuroscientist colleagues, some classical 
protocols of learning like Pavlovian learn-
ing (Carrere & Alexandre 2015) or decision 
making (Carrere & Alexandre 2016). Here, I 
propose to analyze a prospective experiment 
in which we adapt this platform to build a 
subjective representation (as in active com-
puter vision, §16) in the brain module and 
specifically consider introducing, in the 
visual processing regions, some neuronal 
mechanisms known to induce contour il-
lusions (Grossberg & Raizada 2000), other 
mechanisms proposed to induce illusions of 
color constancy (§10), top-down processes 
transmitting expectancies in the lower levels 
of processing (Grossberg & Versace 2008).
Analysis of the experiment
« 7 » Firstly, the above-mentioned neu-
ronal mechanisms have already been proven 
to generate some kinds of illusion but they 
are not able to detect them locally because 
illusions are only emerging from local neu-
ronal mechanisms. Secondly, it is also clear 
that other parts of the software platform will 
represent the environment and accordingly 
the veridical perception. Rephrasing §36, 
we could consequently propose that our 
platform is a support for a good theory of 
perception.
« 8 » The target article has little prob-
lem in defining veridical perception (§38), 
and finds it more difficult to define illusions 
(§40). our approach gives an easier access 
to illusions. Particularly, we could say that 
internal mechanisms in the brain module 
will always modify the sensory input and, 
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accordingly, will always generate a kind of 
illusion. We could also add that only some 
sensory inputs will generate very few modi-
fications, because their characteristics are 
well adapted to the current state and internal 
mechanisms of the brain module and might 
give “the illusion of no illusion.” Perhaps 
here we meet the idea of correct perceptual 
experience “in correspondence with the rel-
evant enactive conditions of the perceiver 
and its environment” (§41).
« 9 » At the end, with this analysis in 
mind, is the problem of misrepresentation 
so important? A certain situation might 
lead to a representation in the environment 
module corresponding to veridical percep-
tion and a representation in the brain mod-
ule corresponding to an illusion. Whereas 
the former representation is simply due to 
the game engine of Minecraft simulating 
the environment, the latter is the kind of 
weak representation evoked above, built 
from sensory input and internal neuro-
nal dynamics, including local mechanisms 
prone to illusions for certain input. That il-
lusion might lead to an erroneous decision, 
but we can also propose that the most im-
portant point is to be able to check that each 
module of the platform obeys its own local 
rules and that the platform conveys two dif-
ferent phenomena, the veridical perception 
and its internal processing, and not a mis-
representation.
« 10 » As an answer to the problem of 
comparability, it can be stated that no two 
organisms are strictly identical and neither 
do they share identical perceptual experi-
ences, with an identical series of perceptual 
episodes received by two identical biologi-
cal organisms (§34 and §43). This platform 
might go beyond this statement and offer a 
more quantitative analysis of the differences 
observed in the parameters describing the 
brain module as a function of changes in 
parameters describing perceptual episodes 
and the initial state of the brain module. 
It might be reasonably supposed that this 
function is most of the time continuous (in 
the mathematical sense) and, accordingly, 
that two similar organisms experiencing 
similar episodes will have few differences. 
In addition, we could also imagine that sin-
gularities of this function (still in the math-
ematical sense) might occur in situations 
where only one organism has an illusion.
« 11 » Concerning the structure sup-
porting shared aspects of perceptual expe-
rience (§13), monitoring the activity of the 
brain module during a set of experiences 
can lead to quantifying modifications that 
have taken place in the module, correspond-
ing to a kind of prior of the agent. Even if it 
is unlikely that agents with different experi-
ences have a well-identified structure with 
shared aspects, one can envisage quantifying 
the level of overlap between two histories of 
modification, at a global level or concerning 
a specific domain, and consequently evalu-
ating an estimation of their degree of resem-
blance. on this view, comparability would 
be rather a matter of degree.
summary
« 12 » our VirtualEnaction platform is a 
convenient tool for manipulating enactivist 
concepts because it offers, on the same plat-
form, access to monitor characteristics of 
the brain-body-environment system quanti-
tatively in space and time. It addition, it ex-
tends the target article because it defines, in 
the brain module, a representation built in 
the weak sense by co-construction between 
inner neuronal mechanisms and ecological 
interactions in the environment, which can 
ease the interpretation of the problems of 
misunderstanding and comparability. The 
fact that this weak representation is consis-
tent with the concept of enacted reality can 
be defended more strongly here because the 
brain module is developed in a systemic 
view, including not only sensory but also 
motor regions that can modify the environ-
ment, giving a concrete anchoring to the 
principle of co-determination between the 
agent and the environment.
« 13 » The role of action (“action shapes 
perception” §1) is central for enactivism and 
has been often discussed when actions are 
oriented toward the environment. In our 
systemic models of the brain, we introduce 
other kinds of actions with no visible effect 
in the outer world but modifying the inter-
nal world, like covert attention (Fix, Rougier 
& Alexandre 2011) or decisions for chang-
ing the current goal (Carrere & Alexandre 
2016). our platform could be a convenient 
tool to study the effects of such internal 
actions on perception. Enactivism has al-
ready had a focused but strong influence in 
modeling sciences and in robotics (Buzsaki, 
Peyrache & Kubie 2014; Friston 2010; Froese 
& Ziemke 2009); exploiting and developing 
this platform in that direction is a new illus-
tration of that influence.
Questions to the authors
« 14 » It is stated in §34 that enacted 
reality can be observed in the system per-
ceiver-environment and is objective. Even if 
we build here only a model of this system, is 
objectivism still present? (Q1)
« 15 » The framework that we present 
here considers the combined effect of differ-
ent agents (brain, body, environment), with 
representations built in the brain module 
from interactions between sensory inputs 
and inner neuronal mechanisms, not only 
for the sensory analysis of the environment 
but also to act and modify it. Is the idea of 
weak representationalism still valid here or 
is it pertinent to introduce instead the idea 
of systemic representationalism? (Q2)
« 16 » Could linking our analysis of the 
problem of comparability (no two organ-
isms are strictly identical but sometimes the 
differences ‒ priors ‒ are weak and the or-
ganisms can be judged similar and able to 
share some experience) and of the problem 
of misrepresentation (a functioning brain 
always modifies sensory inputs and, strictly 
speaking, generates some illusion, but some-
times these modifications are minor and 
have no strong impact on the perceptual 
analysis and subsequent behavior) explain 
some common-sense assumptions? (Q3)
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